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BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS

IBRAHIM GAMBARI, UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

20 December 2005

When I last briefed the Council on this item on behalf of the Secretariat on 30 November I spoke of the opportunities for, and challenges to, progress towards peace in the Middle East.

This month has seen some positive developments, notably steps toward the implementation of the Access and Movement Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. But violence has continued in the occupied Palestinian territory, in Israel and in Lebanon. This violence undoubtedly raises tension in the region at a time when the political situation is evolving very rapidly. In the coming weeks, the parties must strive for a return to calm. An atmosphere of stability and restraint will help to ensure that voices of peace and moderation are heard and heeded during the crucial electoral period.

I would like first to touch upon the economic, fiscal and the humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territory. Let me begin with the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meeting held in London on 14 December, where donors, the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel met to discuss the economic, fiscal and humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territory and to assess progress in Palestinian reform.

The Palestinian Authority presented an update on its precarious financial situation and shared with donors the main elements of its medium-term development plan for the next three years. The meeting adopted a revised donor structure that strengthens the role of the Palestinian Authority. This enhanced role in aid management constitutes an important step towards the assumption of some recipient-State functions by the Palestinian Authority, in accordance with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Paris principles.

The need for the Palestinian Authority to adhere to the reform agenda and to re-establish fiscal discipline was a central theme of the meeting. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported on the fiscal crisis thus: the Palestinian Authority’s deficit rose from 14 per cent to 17 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the past year, and may well reach 19 per cent of GDP in 2006. Donors agreed on the need for the Palestinian Authority to implement, as a matter of priority, a medium-term fiscal stabilization plan and stressed that reform must continue in the coming months, even though the election period may make this more difficult. The Palestinian Authority’s fiscal situation is so acute that there is real concern that, this month, December salaries may not be paid.

The United Nations reported three significant socio-economic trends that emerged in 2005. First, poverty rates increased despite overall growth in the economy and in employment rates. Secondly — and related to that — the gap between rich and poor widened. And, thirdly, geographic disparities became more pronounced, with humanitarian needs highest in the Gaza Strip and in the northern and southern areas of the West Bank.

The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee discussed convening a pledging conference to mobilize the target sum of $3 billion, as agreed in principle at the Group of Eight (G-8) Summit in October. A specific date has not yet been identified, but the conference is expected to take place in the first half of 2006.

I should now like to move on to the status of the implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access. In its presentation to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, the World Bank reiterated that movement restrictions imposed on goods and people continued to be the major obstacle to Palestinian economic growth. That underscores the importance of the Agreement on Movement and Access, which was signed last month. Implementation is proceeding on some parts of the Agreement. For example, the Rafah crossing, between Gaza and Egypt, has been open for five hours each day since 26 November. The Karni crossing, through which produce enters Israel from Gaza, has also remained open since 15 November, allowing the first post-disengagement Palestinian harvest to reach Israeli markets. Both parties must continue to make efforts to ensure that agricultural exports remain a top priority.

The Agreement includes an Israeli commitment to allow the passage of convoys to facilitate the movement of goods and persons between Gaza and the West Bank, specifying that bus convoys would start by 15 December. Despite the concerted efforts of the United States and Mr. James Wolfensohn, the Quartet’s Special Envoy, to resolve outstanding differences and to ensure that Israel’s security concerns are met, the commencement of the convoys remains suspended. We hope that discussions aimed at breaking the impasse will continue on this very important issue.

As for movement in the West Bank, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has reported a slight increase: there are now just over 400 roadblocks and checkpoints. Discussions are ongoing between the Government of Israel and the United States, with United Nations participation, to develop a plan to reduce obstacles to movement in the West Bank.

Let me now turn to the security situation. On 5 December, a suicide bombing in Netanya killed five Israeli civilians and wounded dozens more. Representatives of Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for that attack. The Palestinian Authority, which condemned the act, arrested some 60 suspects following the bombing. The Quartet condemned that terrorist attack in the strongest terms and demanded that the Syrian Government take immediate action to close the offices of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and to prevent the use of its territory by armed groups engaged in terrorist acts. The Quartet also encouraged and supported the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to prevent armed groups from acting against law and order and against the policy of the Authority itself, and urged all parties to exercise restraint, avoid an escalation of violence and keep the channels of communication open.

There have been a number of other worrying security developments since my last briefing to the Council. Over 20 Qassam rockets were fired at Israel since the beginning of December. The outskirts of Ashkelon were hit by rockets for the first time in two and a half years.

The Government of Israel responded to the Netanya terror attack and to the firing of Qassam rockets by tightening the closure regime and by implementing a previously announced resumption of targeted killings. Israeli air force strikes on 6 December and 8 December killed four suspected militants in Gaza. On 14 December, a helicopter strike by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed four men east of Gaza city, reportedly all members of the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees. A failed targeted killing took place on the same day.

While acknowledging the right of Israel to defend itself against terrorist attacks in conformity with international law, it must be noted that extrajudicial killings amount to executions without trial and that innocent bystanders are often killed or injured in those operations. In the targeted killings I have just mentioned alone, 11 other Palestinians, including four children, were reported wounded.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian internal security situation has worsened, with attacks on electoral offices, armed clashes between Fatah factions at the party headquarters and between the Palestinian security forces and armed elements. Clashes with the IDF also led to the death of a Palestinian in Nablus. An Israeli soldier was stabbed to death at the Qalandia checkpoint, and militants killed an Israeli settler near Hebron.

It is clear that the Palestinian Authority must pursue security-sector reform with single-minded determination. The Palestinian Authority’s inter-ministerial working group, supported by the team of the United States Security Coordinator, has now produced a first draft of a security reform white paper. Security-sector reform is expected to feature in the Palestinian Authority’s medium-term development plan.

Let me now say a word about settlement activity. During the reporting period, settlement activity and barrier construction continued. A recent study by the Israeli non-governmental organization Peace Now refers to a list published by the Israeli Ministry of Housing and Construction, reporting that 3,696 housing units are currently being built in West Bank settlements, and another 1,654 in East Jerusalem. We are concerned by unconfirmed reports that the Israeli Defence Minister recently approved plans to construct further housing units in Maale Adumim and other settlements near Jerusalem. According to the road map, Israel is obliged to freeze its settlement activities and to dismantle outposts in the West Bank constructed since March 2001.

With regard to elections, preparations are continuing for the Palestinian Legislative Council elections scheduled for 25 January 2006. Those preparations were marred by violent incidents, many of them arising from internal disagreements within the Fatah party concerning the composition of the party’s lists. The Central Election Commission decided to close down all district offices on 13 December, but it reopened them the following day when police protection was provided, thereby allowing candidates to be registered by the deadline of 14 December. The candidate lists include two Fatah lists, one headed by Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and another under the name Al-Mustaqbal — which is Arabic for “the future” — headed by the imprisoned Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti. Hamas has also formally registered for its first parliamentary elections.

On 15 December, the fourth round of municipal elections took place in the West Bank, including in larger municipalities such as Nablus, Jenin and AlBireh, where Hamas won an overwhelming majority of seats, and Ramallah, where Fatah won. The fifth, and final, round, which will include major constituencies in Gaza, will be organized in early 2006 after the legislative elections themselves.

I now turn to the situation in Lebanon, a country that has had to endure yet another attempt to undermine its stability and independence through the brutal killing of Gebrane Tueni and three others on 12 December. Mr. Tueni was a champion of a democratic, sovereign Lebanon and of a free press. The Security Council and the Secretary-General expressed their condemnation of that act of terrorism, as well as their support for the Government of Lebanon’s determination to bring the perpetrators of that and other such attacks to justice.

We note the decision of the Security Council in resolution 1644 (2005) to establish a tribunal of an international character to try those found responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri, to extend the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission’s technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities and to expand the scope of the Commission’s investigations. The Secretariat is working actively to implement the operative paragraphs of resolution 1644 (2005).

Promoting the stability of Lebanon is a vital part of efforts to achieve comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Mr. Alvaro de Soto, visited Lebanon in early December. In his meetings with the Government of Lebanon, he discussed, among other matters, the need to improve the situation along the Blue Line. That is a matter on which Mr. De Soto has also had discussions with Israel.

The situation along the Blue Line was tense but stable during the reporting period. Hezbollah started to reconstruct its position near Ghajar village, which had been destroyed during the 21 November exchange of fire, on which the Council received a separate briefing. I would like to stress the importance of the Government of Lebanon’s extending control over all of its territory, especially in the South.

Since the last briefing of the Council on 30 November, there have been 19 Israeli air violations, including on the day of Gebran Tueni’s funeral. On 15 December, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon, Mr. Geir Pedersen, yet again expressed his deep concern about those violations and noted that overflights are a serious breach of Lebanese sovereignty. Israel cites the continued presence and activities of Hezbollah as the reason for the violations. We would like to remind both parties, however, that one violation does not justify another. We call again on the Israeli authorities to halt those overflights and on all parties to respect the Blue Line in its entirety.

The road map’s target date for a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now 10 days away. It is obvious therefore that, while we have made very important progress, we will certainly not reach our destination on time. Let me be clear: that does not in any way detract from the centrality of the road map, which remains the agreed framework for achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

This is surely an occasion for all parties to reflect on what more they can do to ensure that road map obligations are met so that we can make genuine progress towards the goal of two States, Israel and an independent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, within secure and recognized borders.

More immediately, however, during this delicate pre-electoral period in both countries, there is a need to respond to the forces of violence and despair with concrete political, economic, security and social action — action that provides a framework in which the agenda of peace is made stronger than the agenda of conflict, violence and terror.

The Palestinian Authority’s inability to exercise control over its territory remains a source of great concern. The Quartet encourages and supports the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to take immediate steps to prevent armed groups from acting against law and order and against the policies of the Authority itself.

Israel’s continued policy of settlement expansion and barrier construction undermines not only Palestinian leaders who are seeking election on a platform of peaceful negotiation with Israel, but also efforts to achieve a viable two-State solution, with a contiguous West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and meaningful linkages between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

I note, in closing, the comments of the Quartet Special Envoy, James Wolfensohn, at the recent donor meeting in London. Mr. Wolfensohn, whose efforts have been so crucial to achieving the progress recorded in 2005, reminded participants that the immediate aftermath of both Palestinian and Israeli elections will be a very critical period of opportunity that neither the parties nor the international community can afford to miss.

BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

IBRAHIM GAMBARI, UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

20 OCTOBER 2005

Over a month has passed since the withdrawal of Israeli settlements and military infrastructure from the Gaza Strip. At the time, we anticipated that the post-disengagement period would hold both hopes and perils. Since then, we have witnessed both.

On the day the Council was last briefed on this item, the level of violence in Gaza escalated when an explosion at a Hamas rally in Jabaliya killed 19 people. Shortly afterwards, Hamas fired rockets into Israel, which responded with air strikes on Gaza and large-scale arrests in the West Bank. Palestinian security forces also clashed with militants.

Those events demonstrate the all too familiar potential for deteriorating security to derail the political process. Scheduled meetings between Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas were twice postponed during the past month.

In short, disengagement has yet to revive the peace process. But we continue to believe that it offers a basis and an opportunity to do exactly that, through completion of the agenda laid out by the Quartet, and by renewed and broader dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian Governments. The international community stands ready to assist, but the responsibility for seizing this opportunity rests, more than ever before, with the parties.

Let me turn to steps taken since disengagement. The Quartet’s Special Envoy, James Wolfensohn, returned to the region on 7 October to push forward the Quartet’s agenda in relation to disengagement. Mr. Wolfensohn sought to conclude agreements on the six-plus-three issues relating to movement, security and reform, which have formed the basis of his work since June.

The first of the six joint issues is border crossings and trade corridors. Reopening the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza is of immediate social and political importance, because it would restore a measure of Palestinian access to the world outside Gaza. It should also pave the way for agreements on border crossings with Israel, a link between Gaza and the West Bank, and the reopening of Gaza’s air and sea ports. Since 17 September, the Rafah crossing has been fully open for only five days, pending agreement between the parties on administration of the crossing. According to the Special Envoy, agreement on the crossing regime is close: the parties have reached consensus on the main technical elements of its administration, and on a thirdparty presence along the border with Egypt. The European Union has offered to consider such a role, although a formal invitation has not yet been issued. We are hopeful, however, that reports that the Rafah crossing will reopen by 15 November are accurate, and we urge the three parties to continue to cooperate on this crucial issue.

The flow of people and goods between Israel and Gaza and between Israel and the West Bank must also be improved. It is the judgement of the Special Envoy that the parties are close to agreement on a management system for those borders, but Israel has, since 5 September, declined to meet with the Palestinian Authority in order to take the negotiations forward. Nor are proposals for a corridor to link the West Bank and Gaza being discussed by the parties. The United States and the World Bank have launched an options review to compare the costs of a road link and those of a railway, but Israel has demanded that work on that study cease.

Meanwhile, the Quartet is implementing a major programme of assistance aimed at creating jobs and at boosting Palestinian recovery in the aftermath of disengagement. On 5 October, the European Commission announced a proposal to increase European Union assistance to Palestinians by approximately €250 million. That offer is, however, conditional on an improvement in the security and movement situation. Other donors have also provided additional assistance, and according to an early estimate, overall disbursements this year will reach $1.1 billion to $1.3 billion, a 25 to 35 per cent increase over the annual average of the past four years. At least 35 per cent of this international assistance to the Palestinians will be channelled through United Nations agencies.

Palestinian recovery will not be sustainable until restrictions on the movement of goods and people are lifted and until the Palestinian Authority is able to establish firm administrative control. We note with concern the Special Envoy’s recent reports on a number of weaknesses in the Palestinian Authority’s internal structures and on its growing fiscal crisis. We also share the Special Envoy’s disappointment that none of the movement issues was resolved this month — especially given the progress that the parties have made on the technical aspects of the Gaza border regimes. We hope for substantive progress during the coming weeks.

I would now like to turn to bilateral talks between the parties and domestic political issues. We have, for some time, been entertaining the hope that disengagement would contribute to the promotion of greater confidence between the parties, leading to dialogue on a broader range of issues. The process undoubtedly increased cooperation between the parties at the working level. The leaders also seem closer to resuming bilateral negotiations. A meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and President Mahmoud Abbas was scheduled for 2 October; that was to have been their first such meeting since June. The meeting was, however, postponed twice and has now been rescheduled for November.

It is clear that the increase in violence played a role in derailing the plans for such bilateral talks between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders and also made their domestic positions even more difficult. Prime Minister Sharon carried out disengagement in the face of vocal domestic pressure; that pressure revived following the 24 September rocket attacks on Sderot. On the Palestinian side, on 3 October the Palestinian Legislative Council called on the President to dissolve the Government and to form another within two weeks. That call was precipitated by heavy armed clashes in Gaza between Palestinian police and militants. Such pressures make it more difficult for both leaders to take further steps towards peace.

With regard to security and violence, I would like to report that the security situation deteriorated significantly during the last week of September and the first week of October. Both Israeli and Palestinian civilians were badly affected by the upsurge in violence during those weeks. Indeed, the events of this month highlight once again the need for greater restraint to be shown in order to protect civilians and to create conditions under which the political process can move forward.

On 23 September, a large explosion at a Hamas rally in the Jabaliya refugee camp killed 19 people and injured 130. According to the Palestinian Authority and most observers, Hamas’s mishandling of explosives at the rally was responsible for the explosion. Hamas, however, blamed Israel and fired 30 rockets into the Israeli town of Sderot on the following day, wounding five Israelis.

Israel responded to that attack by sealing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and it launched air strikes against targets in Gaza during the next four days. Israeli F-16 fighter jets repeatedly flew low over the Gaza Strip. The consequent sonic booms caused widespread fear among the population, and medical officials in Gaza reported negative effects on children and pregnant women. In the West Bank, the Israeli military killed three suspected militants on 29 September and arrested hundreds of others. That series of arrests constituted Israel’s largest since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002.

The Palestinian security services also responded to the upsurge in militant violence, clashing with militants in Gaza and confiscating explosives and Qassam rockets. The Palestinian Authority reported that Palestinian security services had prevented 17 terrorist attacks against Israel since disengagement. The attempt to control militants has tested Palestinian law-enforcement capabilities. On 2 October, a Palestinian police commander and two civilians were killed in clashes with Hamas militants, and more than 40 people, including many children, were injured. On the following day, Palestinian police broke into the compound of the Legislative Council, firing into the air in protest at their inability to deal with militant attacks.

The security situation improved somewhat during the second week of October, but on 16 October, militants from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade shot dead three Israelis as they travelled to settlements in the West Bank. Israel responded by imposing tight restrictions on Palestinian movement in the West Bank.

The United States Security Coordinator, General William Ward, and his team continue with their important work to push forward security sector reform. The Palestinian leadership has announced a decision to confiscate illegally held weapons and has nominated three officials who will bear overall responsibility for security sector reform. Such steps could contribute significantly to the control of internal violence and to progress towards the fulfilment of Palestinian road map commitments related to security. Further progress in this area is absolutely critical during the coming weeks and months.

Furthermore, regarding movement and closures, the movement of people and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip has been restricted more heavily than it was during the months preceding disengagement. The number of workers crossing into Israel via Erez dropped dramatically. In addition to closures at Rafah and Erez, the Karni goods transit terminal was closed for several days, causing a reduction in both exports from and imports into Gaza and leading to shortages of foodstuffs such as milk.

We cannot yet attribute that increase in movement restrictions entirely to the post-disengagement situation, because it conforms to a pattern of closures imposed by Israel during the Jewish holidays in previous years. In previous years, long periods of closure have also had a serious impact on incomes and the economy in Gaza. The effects of movement restrictions are particularly worrying in this very fragile post-disengagement period.

As reported in previous briefings, Israel has reduced the number of checkpoints and closure measures in the West Bank during the course of 2005. But closure measures were again increased after three Israelis were shot and killed on 16 October.

The concerns about settlement construction and the barrier that were recently reiterated by the Quartet do not appear to have been heeded. Israel continues to construct the barrier in the Jerusalem area. Settlements and the restrictions that surround them and the barrier continue to impede Palestinian movements within the West Bank. Movement restrictions created by the barrier, by the checkpoints, by the border closures and by poor internal security continue to impede the ability of United Nations agencies and programmes to provide assistance to Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank.

Let me say a word about elections. I would like to mention that the Palestinians held a third round of municipal elections in the West Bank on 29 September. Elections in Gaza were postponed due to security concerns. Participation in the poll was high and Fatah won over 53 per cent of seats in municipal councils, compared to 26 per cent won by Hamas. Technical preparations are under way for forthcoming Palestinian legislative elections, which are scheduled for 25 January 2006.

There have been a number of important developments in Lebanon. As members are aware, there was yet another attempted assassination, this time targeting May Chidiac, a prominent Lebanese journalist and political talk show host. The incident took place on 25 September in the town of Jounieh, north of Beirut, and involved a bomb placed under her car. Fortunately, Ms. Chidiac survived the attempt on her life, although she was seriously injured. The Secretary-General reiterated the United Nations condemnation of such acts of terror, aimed at intimidation and destabilization, and expressed his sympathies to Ms. Chidiac and her family. The Secretary-General again emphasized the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of that and other recent terrorist actions in Lebanon.

I am pleased to report that the situation along the Blue Line in southern Lebanon has remained calm. However, I regret to note again the continued Israeli air violations of the Blue Line and Lebanese airspace. Since the last briefing of the Council, a total of 11 air violations, involving 19 aircraft, have been recorded.

That is all I am going to say about Lebanon. I am sure that some will be disappointed, because of course they would like to hear about the Mehlis report. That is reserved for when Mr. Mehlis briefs the Council himself in both private and public meetings.

I wish to make a few observations. A month ago, Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and the Palestinians’ success in restraining violence during the disengagement period contributed to a sense of optimism in the Middle East. Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians seemed close to agreeing measures that would enable the population of Gaza to travel and trade more easily. Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas were planning to meet for the first time since June. Other developments pointed to a thaw in the attitudes of some Arab and Islamic countries towards Israel. An upsurge in violence, however, has undermined those positive political developments and dulled the sense of optimism. The postponement of proposed meetings between President Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon was particularly disappointing, since a return to bilateral negotiations would have marked an important turning point in the efforts to end the conflict.

Israeli and Palestinian leaders are now planning to resume talks in November. In our view, such meetings should take place periodically, and we hope that the leaders will have the tenacity and the courage to continue with negotiations over the coming months, even if further security crises occur. The political track has to be resilient to the inevitable ups and downs of this unstable post-disengagement period.

The international community, meanwhile, will continue to play its part in consolidating the success of disengagement. Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn will continue his efforts to push the parties towards agreement on the key “six plus three” issues. The donors are also pulling their weight to build on the positive momentum created by disengagement.

The Quartet will continue, as it has for the past three years, to work to achieve the vision of a just, lasting and comprehensive regional peace based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002). We welcome today’s meeting between President Bush and President Abbas in Washington, D.C. However, the international community can only assist in restarting the peace process; it cannot lead a return to negotiations unless both parties take bold steps to fulfil their respective commitments. The parties must work constructively over the coming month to clear up the outstanding access and movement issues relating to disengagement, acting in parallel to implement obligations set out in the road map.

One of Israel’s primary obligations under the road map is to halt all settlement activity, including natural growth, and dismantle outposts erected since March 2001. The cessation of settlement activity is an important confidence-building measure; while Israel continues to construct settlements in the West Bank, it is hard for President Abbas to convince Palestinians that peaceful negotiations with Israel will lead to the creation of a viable Palestinian State. The same must be said of Israel’s construction of the barrier on Palestinian land.

For its part, the Palestinian Authority must persist with comprehensive reform and with the strengthening of its security services with the aim of ending violence and terror, as stipulated in the road map. The events of the past month have highlighted how Palestinian internal security problems have the potential to derail the political process and the peace process. There is evidence that Palestinians strongly support President Abbas’ efforts to rein in militant groups. The Palestinian leadership now needs to build on that support and demonstrate its ability to improve Palestinian law enforcement capabilities.

Finally, I would like to say that the withdrawal of Israeli settlers and military infrastructure has lifted a burden from the people of Gaza. It also has the potential to create new opportunities for peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Further energetic coordination, cooperation and engagement by Israelis, by the Palestinians and by the international community are needed in order to translate successful disengagement into a negotiated and sustainable peace.

BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

ALVARO DE SOTO, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COORDINATOR
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

23 SEPTEMBER 2005

In the early hours of 12 September, Israel withdrew the last of its military personnel and installations from the Gaza Strip, the first such withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory since 4 June 1967. Furthermore, as of 20 September, and following the completion of the evacuation of civilian army infrastructure from four settlements in the northern West Bank, Israeli forces put an end to their permanent presence in the area of the evacuated settlements.

On 20 September the Quartet, meeting in New York, welcomed that development, paid tribute to the political courage of Prime Minister Sharon, commended the Israeli Government, its armed forces and its police for the smooth and professional execution of the operation and expressed its appreciation for the responsible behaviour of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people for helping to maintain a peaceful environment during the evacuation.

Facing vociferous opposition, the Israeli Government has proved its ability to carry out democratic decisions in the general interest while knowing that they would cause pain and disruption to a significant number of its citizens. The exemplary consideration shown by the Israeli armed forces towards those affected, on some of whom carefully measured force had to be employed, shows that they can be held to the highest standards in dealing with civilians.

In his statement last week at the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, Prime Minister Sharon said to the gathered leaders that the Palestinians “are also entitled to freedom and to a national, sovereign existence in a State of their own” (A/60/PV.5). By withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and ending military law there, he said, “[T]he State of Israel proved that it is ready to make painful concessions in order to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians”. Looking ahead, the Prime Minister added,

“Successful implementation of the disengagement plan opens a window of opportunity for advancing towards peace, in accordance with the sequence of the road map. The State of Israel is committed to the road map and to the implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh understandings. And I hope that it will be possible, through them, to renew the political process”.

The timing of Israel’s disengagement was not the result of an agreement with the Palestinian side, but of a unilateral Israeli decision. However, all relevant sectors of the Palestinian Authority worked diligently and constructively to coordinate with their Israeli counterparts, with the good offices and assistance of James Wolfensohn, the Quartet’s Special Envoy for Disengagement; General William Ward, the United States Security Coordinator; and other international actors, the Egyptian Government prominent among them. Early fears that the operation might have to be conducted under fire were dissipated. Palestinian armed groups by and large held back from violent action against settlers. The Israeli settlers, armed forces and police withdrew in peace. The habit of coordination developed among Palestinians and Israelis in the last few months is a valuable asset on which to continue building in the coming period.

With regard to Quartet engagement and activities, the Quartet met at the United Nations on 20 September to discuss the Israeli withdrawal and the prospects for movement towards peace in the Middle East. A statement was issued following the meeting, and the principals held a press conference. I can therefore spare members of the Security Council a detailed exegesis. However, I should like to highlight a few issues that were discussed.

One was how to take advantage of the momentum gathered and move ahead. It was essential to bring about an early improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians. Quick-impact, employment-generating projects are envisaged for that purpose, but it is also urgent that the parties should come to resolution on the four issues related to movement of persons and goods, out of the six issues identified by James Wolfensohn. The Quartet also focused on the need for renewed action in parallel by both parties on their obligations, in accordance with the sequence of the road map. Elections are foreseen soon in occupied Palestinian territory, and possibly in Israel down the road. Bold initiatives will have to await the propitious moment.

Another issue discussed by the Quartet was that of armed groups and the political process in the Palestinian territories. The Quartet noted that the Palestinian Authority leadership has condemned violence and has sought to encourage Palestinian groups who have engaged in terrorism to abandon that course and engage in the democratic process. “Ultimately”, said the Secretary-General speaking on behalf of the Quartet at the subsequent press conference,

“those who want to be part of the political process should not engage in armed group or militia activities, for there is a fundamental contradiction between such activities and the building of a democratic State”.

In response to questions, Quartet members made clear, against that background, that they viewed the forthcoming legislative elections as part of a transition towards a democratic system. That must be a Palestinian process, on which Palestinians must be in the lead. They should be able to count on the necessary cooperation of all concerned so that the transition proceeds successfully.

Beyond disengagement, the Quartet urged the parties to return to the cooperative agenda agreed upon at Sharm el-Sheikh and to avoid unilateral actions that prejudice final status issues. The Quartet reaffirmed that any final agreement must be reached through negotiations between the parties and that the new Palestinian State must be truly viable, with contiguity in the West Bank and connectivity to Gaza.

While noting that in Gaza and the northern West Bank Israel had in fact acted beyond its obligations as provided in the first phase of the road map, the Quartet expressed its concern that settlement expansion elsewhere must stop and urged Israel to remove all unauthorized outposts. The Quartet continued to note with concern the route of the Israeli separation barrier, particularly as it results in the confiscation of Palestinian land, cuts off the movement of people and goods and undermines Palestinians’ trust in the road map process, as it appears to prejudge the final borders of a Palestinian State.

With regard to disengagement, I do not need to dwell on the details of the withdrawal referred to in last month’s briefing and earlier in this presentation. It was executed with surprising speed and well in advance of the scheduled dates. There are no longer any Israeli military personnel or installations, and what has been left behind is being dealt with in accordance with understandings reached between the parties. United Nations agencies and programmes are working in support of the goals laid down by the Quartet. The success of those activities will depend, to a great degree, on swift and efficacious access and on an adequate security environment, particularly in the Gaza Strip, so that United Nations agencies can operate safely and effectively.

With regard to security and violence, in last month’s briefing we referred to the worsening in the Palestinian internal security situation during the run-up to the withdrawal and immediately afterward. The killing, apparently an extrajudicial execution, of former security chief Musa Arafat, and the chaos of spontaneous Palestinian celebrations in the wake of Israeli withdrawal, particularly at the Egyptian border, underscore the need for credible action by the Palestinian Authority to bring the perpetrators of past violent actions to justice.

It was reported by the Palestinian Authority that, amid the Palestinian celebrations at Rafah following Israel’s withdrawal, some light arms had been smuggled into the Gaza Strip. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas pledged to prevent further border infiltrations. On 15 September, as the Egyptian border police force was completing its deployment along the Philadelphi route, the border with the Gaza Strip was closed, ending four days of large-scale free passage in both directions. The border remains closed.

Violence continued elsewhere during the past month. This morning Israeli special units killed three Palestinians in Tulkarem, and rockets were fired from Beit Hanoun into Israel. Earlier in the month a Palestinian stabbed two yeshiva students, one British and one American, in the Old City of Jerusalem, killing one and injuring the other; the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) killed five Palestinians in Tulkarem; and a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up in Beer Sheva in Israel. Home-made rockets, mortar shells and anti-tank missiles were also fired from different locations inside the Gaza Strip towards Israeli-controlled areas and nearby Israeli towns, though at a significantly decreased level. During the reporting period, a total of 15 Palestinians, in addition to one foreigner, were killed.

On barrier construction and settlement activities, the construction of Israel’s West Bank barrier is progressing rapidly in those parts of the route which have not been contested in court and for which judicial orders to suspend construction have not been issued. As of 1 July 2005, approximately 215 kilometres had been completed and 176 kilometres are under construction, or about 58 per cent of the barrier’s total length.

When my colleague, Ibrahim Gambari, head of the Department of Political Affairs, briefed the Security Council a month ago, he mentioned land requisition orders to allow the extension of the barrier around Jerusalem eastward so as to envelop the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, which has elicited great concern, as it could have the practical effect of bisecting the West Bank. Construction of this segment of the barrier has not begun. As concerns the controversial E1 plan for settlement construction in the area between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim, the Deputy Prime Minister recently reiterated Israel’s commitment to keep it frozen, while reiterating Israel’s intention to build it in due course.

I turn now to the question of closures and movement restrictions. In a June 2004 report entitled “Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements”, the World Bank stated that

“Palestinian economic recovery depends on a radical easing of internal closures throughout the West Bank, the opening of Palestinian external borders to commodity trade, and sustaining a reasonable flow of Palestinian labour into Israel”.

In James Wolfensohn’s words, based on the Bank’s findings, “without the re-establishment of free movement inside the West Bank, a viable Palestinian economy is not possible”.

Since the beginning of 2005, there has been a 37 per cent reduction in the number of internal obstacles on roads in the West Bank, including checkpoints. These obstacles now number 376, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Much of the reduction has been in the northern West Bank, where movement has been freed up in line with disengagement from four northern West Bank settlements. Obstacles have also been removed in the western area of the West Bank, where the barrier is under construction, making many of those obstacles redundant.

The biggest impact of this easing is to improve Palestinian access to health and education services, particularly from villages to main towns. It is unlikely, however, that this will result in a significant improvement in the economic situation, as delays still occur as a result of random vehicle checking and restrictions on movement entering and exiting from main cities, especially Jerusalem.

Through a series of discussions, OCHA and the IDF have reached a common understanding on the number and location of checkpoints and other obstacles, albeit with minor differences in definition. Further dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and the Israel Defense Forces, with the aim of easing restrictions on Palestinian movement, combined with a more in-depth examination of the impact of physical obstacles, is being conducted by OCHA.

The withdrawal of Israeli soldiers resulted in the removal of internal movement restrictions imposed by Israel in the Gaza Strip. Tight restrictions continue on issuance of permits for Gaza Strip workers in Israel and the Erez industrial estate at the north of the Strip. On 1 September, Palestinian merchants from the West Bank were allowed to enter Israel for the first time since a general closure was imposed on 12 July 2005. Only a limited number of Palestinian workers with permits are allowed entry to Israel and East Jerusalem.

I now turn to the situation in Lebanon. On 19 September, Prime Minister Siniora presented his Government’s plans for political, economic and institutional reforms to the core group ministerial meeting on Lebanon in New York. The Secretary-General and other members reaffirmed their intention to assist the Government of Lebanon in its efforts to institute reforms and achieve lasting stability. Another major challenge for the new Government is to implement effective reforms in the security apparatus. We were reminded of the importance of this last Friday when a new bomb went off in a densely populated area in eastern Beirut, killing one person and injuring more than 20. The Secretary-General strongly condemns this act of terrorism. He expresses the resolve of the United Nations, and indeed the international community, to assist the Government of Lebanon in its efforts to improve the security situation in the country and to bring to justice the perpetrators of this and other similar acts of terror.

While it appears that these acts have been designed to create panic and perhaps provoke reactions amongst the Lebanese public, our impression is that there has been a mature and calm approach in the face of these provocations. It is clear that the majority of Lebanese are determined not to have their progress towards a united, sovereign and democratic Lebanon derailed. We must continue to work to help the Lebanese achieve this.

Over this past month, the Blue Line also remained relatively calm, despite the firing of two missiles from Lebanese territory on 25 August. One landed close to the Lebanese village of Meis el Jabal, the other across the Blue Line close to a residential area of Kibbutz Margilot in northern Israel. Fortunately, there were no casualties. Hizbullah denied any involvement, and there was a claim of responsibility from Palestinian Islamic Jihad. However, it has not been possible to definitely establish who was responsible. It is nonetheless clear that this again underlines the need for the Government of Lebanon to exert its full authority in the south and prevent such violations from taking place.

Over this past month, there were seven Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace observed by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the latest on 22 September. On 8 September the Israeli authorities handed over the body of a Hizbullah fighter who had been killed in the Shab’a farms area on 29 June. The arrangements for this transfer were made through the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Tension increased on 16 September when two Lebanese shepherds who had crossed the Blue Line in the Shab’a farms area were apprehended by the IDF. UNIFIL liaison with both sides worked in the first instance to handle the issue in a calm, non-escalatory manner. This facilitated a resolution, with the IDF releasing the shepherds the next day through UNIFIL.

Allow me to close with a few personal comments. The objective benefits of the recently concluded disengagement from Gaza and the northern West Bank are obvious and fairly easy to itemize. The Palestinians have experienced the joy of the departure of the occupier; the Israelis are no longer saddled with the unrewarding, Sisyphus-like grind of securing a piece of land in which, to paraphrase Prime Minister Sharon’s 15 August speech, squalor and resentment are untenably juxtaposed with prosperity. Israel has demonstrated that it can make the sacrifices that are required to make peace; the Palestinians have shown self-restraint in the face of unilateral decisions and tight time frames. Forces of moderation have prevailed over those of extremism to mingle again — dare I say it? — in a shared mainstream of moderation and willingness to compromise. A mechanism for coordination at all levels is in place and is working. A basis has been laid for a true partnership, which should encourage each party to understand and address the other’s legitimate needs and concerns.

The Israeli need for security has led them to install, encroaching on Palestinian occupied territory, a barrier — a generic term encompassing a combination of grid fences, barbed wire, trenches, electronic devices, watch towers and, in some places, most prominently around Jerusalem, a dauntingly high and very forbidding-looking wall. In addition, Israel runs a system of roadblocks and checkpoints — some stable, some intermittent — to control the movement of persons and goods into and throughout much of the West Bank.

Apart from impeding economic revival, to many Palestinians — and I speak here of the millions who have no connection with, or sympathy for, those who resort to violence, and who merely wish to move about to earn their living or visit their separated loved ones, attend school or seek medical care — the barrier and the closures, and the travails of traversing them, are a source of humiliation and a constant check on their aspiration to one day run their own affairs. The expense incurred in the building of the barrier raises doubts in some minds as to its stated provisionality. Questions have also been posed as to whether the purpose is only to ensure security.

Beyond the relief of recovered land and freedom of internal movement, the Palestinians who live in Gaza will wonder what has changed if this is not followed by their ability to link up with their brethren in the West Bank and in the outside world.

While Israelis should understand those considerations and recognize that it is ultimately in their interest to address them, Palestinians for their part must understand, accept and address Israel’s need to be assured of the safety and security of its citizens. Countless innocent Israelis have fallen victim to terrorist acts, and Israelis have a right to demand that this should cease. Palestinians — not just the leadership and not just the mainstream — must accept that there can be a solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine only in the framework of two States living alongside each other and sorting out their differences peacefully and respectfully. They must renounce the resort to violence as a means to achieve their ends, however legitimate these may be. Those who have carried out acts of terror or instigated them should understand that this has rendered the achievement of the goal of a State in which Palestinians live in freedom and dignity more distant rather than the contrary.

It is often overlooked that security, broadly writ, is not just an Israeli requirement. The Palestinian people at large demand that law and order be established in the streets, which means not only an efficient police but also a reliable court system and an end to impunity and to corruption. The Palestinian Authority is the underpinning for a still incipient Stateto-be; the Palestinians understandably expect it to discharge the responsibilities which normally fall to the Government in a State. As members of the Quartet said on Tuesday, 20 September, at their press conference, the Palestinian Authority is in transition to democracy. It must be seen by the Palestinians that it is indeed pointed in that direction and moving toward it. The political will of the Palestinian Authority must be unequivocal.

Development of a State run by the rule of law, in which the Government holds the monopoly over the instruments of violence — clearly a Palestinian interest — goes hand in hand with the strengthening of Israel’s sense of security. A State at peace with itself generates security in its neighbours.

Let me conclude with this thought. It is unfortunately difficult to circumvent the classic chicken-and-egg conundrum: Israeli leaders demand an end to violence before addressing further Palestinian concerns; Palestinian leaders find it difficult, for their part, to persuade extremists to restrain themselves and accept to work toward a democracy if they are unable to point to a visible prospect of satisfaction of their legitimate goals on the horizon.

Beyond disengagement, it is difficult to see how this conundrum can be resolved, and the process moved forward, other than by the discharge, in parallel, of the parties’ respective obligations, which is the approach of the Quartet in the road map, which has been endorsed by the Council. In the light of the mix of facts created on the ground and declarations of intent by Israel, many Palestinians wonder about the prospects for a viable Palestinian State down the road. Only Israel can persuade them that this is still achievable and thus encourage them to work cooperatively toward that goal. For their part, the Israelis have reason to query whether the State that is emerging next door will be a good neighbour. To renew the Israelis’ faith, the Palestinians would have to show that they indeed will be such a neighbour, by making concrete and convincing efforts to end violence. Thus, understanding each other’s needs and concerns, the parties would advance on parallel, mutually reinforcing tracks.